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CASES NOTED
TAX COURT ABROGATES CONTROVERSIAL
ATTRIBUTION RULING
Decedent's estate was comprised primarily of stock in two
family-owned corporations. Decedent and his wife owned, as commu-
nity property,' one-third of the stock of each corporation. The remain-
ing two-thirds of the stock was owned by their two sons in equal
shares. At decedent's death, pursuant to stock purchase agreements,
each corporation redeemed 2 its respective shares from the estate and
the widow, who was the sole beneficiary. 3 The estate and the widow
treated the redemptions as distributions in exchange for stock under
section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,4 which resulted in
the proceeds being treated as capital gains and not as ordinary div-
idends. They asserted that the redemptions completely terminated
their interests in the corporations as required by section 302(b)(3). 5 In
order to prevent application of the stock attribution rules of section
318(a)(1), which apply to section 302(b)(3) distributions, 6 the executor of
the estate and the widow filed the appropriate waiver agreements as
provided in section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii). 7 The Commissioner conceded that
1. The parties were residents of the state of California. Rev. Rul. 71-138, 1971-1 CuM.
BULL. 109 requires both a husband and wife to file a section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) agreement in cases
where community property is being redeemed.
2. Section 317(b) of the Internal Revenue Code defines "redemption" as a corporate acquisi-
tion of its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property, whether or not the stock so acquired
is cancelled, retired or held as treasury stock. See also Estate of Mathis, 47 T.C. 248 (1966),
acquiesced in 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 3.
3. As to the definition of a beneficiary of an estate, see Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(a) (1960).
4. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended [hereinaf-
ter cited by section only].
5. Other subparagraphs of section 302 can also qualify a redemption as a sale or exchange.
Section 302(b)(1) affords such treatment if the transaction is not essentially equivalent to a taxable
dividend and section 302(b)(2) is applied where the redemption is substantially disproportionate
with respect to the shareholder. These subparagraphs are seldom used in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), which held that neither the
absence of a tax avoidance motive nor the existence of a bona fide business purpose would avoid
ordinary dividend treatment of the redemption proceeds when such a redemption does not change
the relative rights or economic interests of the shareholders. For considerations of "termination of
interest" in general, see Bryant v. Comm'r., 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968); Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213
F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954); Gordon Erickson, 56 T.C. 1112 (1971).
6. The attribution rules under section 302 serve to attribute stock todistributee, not away
from him to other shareholders. Friend v. United States, 345 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1965).
7. The constructive ownership rules of section 318(a) apply to any stock redemption done
under section 302(b). However, a special exception under section 302(c)(2) provides that section
318(a) will not apply in section 302(b)(3) cases if three conditions of section 302(c)(2) are satisfied:
(i) immediately after the distribution the distributee has no interest in the corporation
(including an interest as officer, director, or employee), other than an interest as a
creditor,(ii) the distributee does not acquire any such interest (other than stock acquired by
bequest or inheritance) within 10 years from the date of such distribution, and
(iii) the distributee, at such time and in such manner as the Secretary or his delegate by
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the widow's redemption qualified under section 302(b)(3), but claimed
the estate would not be considered a distributee eligible to file the
necessary agreement. It was the Services' contention that only indi-
viduals, not estates or trusts, could file waiver agreements. 8 Accord-
ingly, as a result of the attribution rules of section 318(a)(1) being
applied to the redemption of the estate's stock, no termination of
interest occurred and the estate was deemed to own 100% of the stock
of both corporations, constructively and actually, both before and after
the redemptions. 9 The Commissioner concluded that the entire dis-
tribution was to be treated as a taxable dividend, not as a sale or
exchange of stock. Contrary to the Commissioner's position, the
United States Tax Court, on petition by the widow and the estate,
held: An estate can be considered a distributee under section 302(b)(3),
thereby making it eligible to waive the attribution rules of section
318(a)(1) upon filng of section 302(c)(2) agreements. Lillian M. Craw-
ford, 59 T.C. 830 (1973).
The crux of the case dealt with the "distributee" issue and was the
first court test of the Commissioner's position on this matter. '0 Section
302(c)(2) refers to a "distributee" as the person who is eligible to file a
waiver agreement as provided in that code section. In Crawford, the
Commissioner, basing his position on Revenue Ruling 59-233,11 as-
serted that the estate was not within the purview of this definition, and
therefore could not file an effective agreement. The factual situation of
Revenue Ruling 59-233 involved the redemption of corporate stock
from a testamentary trust created by a deceased mother for her chil-
dren. The balance of the corporation's stock was owned by the father.
The Commissioner concluded that the trust was deemed to own con-
structively all of the stock of the corporation, 12 despite the timely filing
of a section 302(c)(2) waiver agreement. 13 The ruling limited the appli-
regulations prescribes, files an agreement to notify the Secretary or his delegate of
any acquisition described in clause (ii) and to retain such records as may be
necessary for the application of this paragraph.
8. Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 106. Accord, Rev. Rul. 72-472, 1972-2 CuM.
BULL. 202, which holds that a trust cannot utilize the waiver provisions of section 302(c)(2). See
also Rev. Rul. 72-471, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 201 (regarding grantor trusts).
9. If the section 302(c)(2) agreements were ineffective, section 318(a)(1) would attribute the
sons' shares of both corporations to their widowed mother and section 318(a)(3)(A) would
reattribute all the shares to the estate since she was the sole beneficiary. See also Stanley F.
Grabowski Trust, 58 T.C. 650 (1972); Webber v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Ky.
1967), aff'd, 404 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1968); Rev. Rul. 67-24, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 75; Rev. Rul.
71-211, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 112; Rev. Rul. 71-262, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 110.
10. One author has questioned the Commissioner's wisdom in selecting Crawford as a test
case for the distributee issue. See Covey, Estate, Gift and Income Taxation-1973 Developments,
U. MIAMI 8TH INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 74-1 (1974).
11. 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 106.
12. S3e section 318(a)(3)(B)(i).
13. There are a number of cases regarding a late filing of the agreement and the provision
relating to the statute of limitations. These problems are not considered in conjunction with the
case at hand since both parties' agreements were timely filed. However, for contrasting decisions
in this area, see Robin Haft Trust, 61 T.C. 398 (1973) (where each redeemed shareholder was a
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cation of agreements to those circumstances where a shareholder as an
individual was involved. If an entity, such as a trust or an estate, was
the distributee, its filing of a section 302(c)(2) agreement was deemed
ineffective in waiving the family attribution rules.' 4
The effects of this ruling create potential problem situations where
a buy-sell agreement is involved in a corporate redemption. Under
entity buy-sell agreements, the corporation usually purchases the stock
held by the estate of the deceased shareholder. In closely held corpora-
tions where the surviving shareholders are family members, the trans-
action entails the risk of triggering the attribution rules, thereby
preventing a redemption of the estate's stock from qualifying under
section 302(b)(3). 15 The promulgation of Rev. Rul. 59-233 conse-
quently made this area of estate planning very difficult since it was
impossible to predict a shareholder's status regarding family attribu-
tion at the time of his death.
In this ruling and in Crawford, the Commissioner reviewed the
legislative history of section 302(c)(2) 16 and claimed that a strict literal
interpretation should be applied to the semantic terminology "dis-
tributee." The Tax Court summarized this contention with the follow-
ing discussion:
[The Commissioner] contends that "distributee" refers to the
family members described in section 318(a)(1) and that the
waiver is applicable only to the redemption of the stock of a
family member and not to the redemption of the stock held
by an entity like an estate. Happily, respondent has not tried
to persuade us that the exclusive reference of "distributee" to
family members is contained in either the language or the
syntax of the statute because we are fairly confident that no
such reference could be found therein. Respondent does con-
tend that his position is "clear" from the legislative history of
section 302(c)(2). 17
The court rejected this approach as it was clearly in contravention of
the intent of Congress. The court refused to "slavishly apply the literal
language of a statute""' even though the Commissioner urged the
tribunal to "eschew literality in determining which 'distributees' may
avail themselves of Section 302(c)(2 .... " 9 The Commissioner further
family trust); Fehrs Fin. Co., 58 T.C. 174 (1972), aff'd 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973); Georgie S.
Cary, 41 T.C. 214 (1963), nonacquiesced in 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 8; Archbold v. United States,
201 F. Supp. 329 (D.N.J. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 311 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1963); Van Keppel v.
United States, 206 F. Suop. 42 (D. Kan. 1962), qff'd 321 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1963).
14. Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 106 applies to estates, trusts, corporations or
partnerships which are shareholders in the distributing company.
15. See Rev. Rul. 69-562, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 47.
16. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954); H.R. REP,. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 35 (1954).
17. 59 T.C. at 835.
18. Id. at 836. See International Trading Co., 57 T.C. 455, 461 (1971).
19. 59 T.C. at 836.
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claimed that permitting an estate to avail itself of this waiver of
attribution provision would lead to abuses.20 Although acknowledging
the potential for abuse, the Court reasoned that:
Our decision here rests solely upon the effectiveness of the
waiver agreement filed by petitioner .... [W]e are concerned
that the positions taken by respondent will prevent a family
member who receives his interest in a corporation through
inheritance from terminating this interest in a redemption
qualifying under § 302(b)(3) unless the stock is first distrib-
uted to him by the estate. Even if it were possible for estates
to distribute the stock in all instances prior to the redemp-
tion, respondent's positions merely put a premium on tax
planning and set a trap for the unwary. 21
The Tax Court buttressed its opinion by noting that the actual word-
ing of section 302(c)(2) uses the neutral term "distributee" instead of
personal pronouns. It therefore concluded that Congress did not intend
exclusive application of the term "distributee" to persons, thereby
allowing entities such as estates or trusts to be included in this
definition.
An interesting aspect of the opinion concerns its failure to discuss
the consequences of situations other than simultaneous redemptions by
an estate and a beneficiary. This omission from the court's discussion
creates a potential for abuse which the Commissioner fully recognized.
In the case, the Commissioner argued that permitting an estate to avail
itself of the waiver provision would lead to abuse, as the agreement
filed by the estate would not prevent the beneficiaries from subse-
quently acquiring an interest in the corporation within the forbidden
ten year period.2 2 A reacquisition by a beneficiary in such a situation
would not affect an estate's redemption under section 302(b)(3) and yet
would still permit ownership of a prohibited stock interest in the
corporation by blocking the chain of attribution. 23 Imposition of trans-
feree liability on the beneficiary is unsuccessful because in order to
impose such liability, the distributee, the estate, must first be in
violation of the code limitations, which, as a result of Crawford, it is
not. The court apparently thought that this collateral result of its
ruling was not an overriding consideration and bluntly stated that
"[w]hile such a potential for abuse does exist, the particular remedy
proposed by respondent [disqualification of the estate's waiver
agreement] will itself lead to a nonsensical result in this and other
cases. "24
20. Id.
21. Id. at 837.
22. See section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii).
23. For an analysis of examples before and after Crawford, see Hull, Review of the Recent
Tax Court Decision in Crawford v. Commissioner, 37 CONN. CPA 22 (Sept. 1973).
24. 59 T.C. at 836.
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This reasoning is indicative of the court's efforts in this case to
avoid the creation of any additional tax traps. However, one point is
not clearly resolved. The opinion accepts the petitioner's contention
that an estate can utilize section 302(c)(2) agreements in cases where
the beneficiaries have also executed and filed the waiver agreement in
a simultaneous redemption, but does not consider a situation where
only the stock of the estate is to be redeemed. It should be noted that
Crawford deals with an estate and a sole beneficiary simultaneously
executing the section 302(c)(2) agreements. 25 The decision did not state
whether the filing of the waiver by an estate alone would block family
attribution to the entity. Although the answer is not evident from the
opinion, a careful reading infers that the court will treat estate or trust
entities as separate parties when determining whether a complete
termination of interest has occurred by the filing of a section 302(c)(2)
agreement by the particular entity.
It is obvious that Crawford will have a highly significant effect in
the field of estate planning for three important reasons: (1) an estate or
trust, through its fiduciary, can now execute section 302(c)(2) waiver
agreements and avert the family attribution rules; (2) stock owned by
an estate or trust in a family corporation may be redeemed without the
redemption being treated as a dividend; and (3) once an entity has
executed the waiver agreement, a beneficiary may reacquire stock in
the corporation within the forbidden ten year period without any
consequence to the estate.2 6 These factors must be viewed as broad
rejections by the Tax Court of the potential problems once posed by
Rev. Rul. 59-233.
The holding of the instant case leaves no doubts that the
Commissioner's prior position was without merit. Although it is unfor-
tunate that almost fifteen years elapsed before the matter was sub-
jected to judicial review, it is evident as a result of the Crawford
decision that section 302(c)(2) agreements filed by entities will now be
afforded the same effectiveness as those executed by individuals in
their application to section 302(b)(3) redemptions.
GEORGE RETOS, JR.
25. See Rev. Rul. 68-388, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 122, where an estate failed to block the
attribution rules by conducting a simultaneous redemption and sale of the corporate stock with
the sole beneficiary. The situation involved the distribution of stock to the beneficiary who then
redeemed his shares for cash. The beneficiary subsequently repurchased the stock from the
corporation. The repurchase was disallowed as an unpermittable disguised redemption from the
estate.
26. This was also previously possible under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Rev. Rul.
71-562, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 173 (holding that an acquisition by a son of the distributee within the
ten year period does not violate section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii)); Rev. Rul. 72-380, 1972-2 CUM. BULL.
201 (permitting distributees, as executors, to vote stock of an estate without triggering the
attribution rules). For a general discussion regarding estate planning in this area, see Rabin,
Section 302 and 303 Redemptions and Disasters, U. MIAMI 2ND INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 68-16,
68.1600 (1968).
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